Showing posts with label Narendra Modi. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Narendra Modi. Show all posts
Monday, June 21, 2010
Two roads diverged in a yellow wood..
Further to my last post, Nitish Kumar has begun to set out his terms for a continuation of his alliance with the BJP: Narendra Modi and the incendiary Varun Gandhi have to be barred from any role in the campaign for the Assembly elections. The BJP's response to this "non-negotiable" demand will indicate whether they have the political courage to prioritize this vitally important coalition partner over hubris. If Kumar's demand is accepted, it will also be a uniquely potent blow to Modi's own ambitions.
Tuesday, June 15, 2010
Bowling alone
It appears to be an almost inexorable law of modern politics that, following electoral defeat, a right-wing party turns initially to its far-right "core", analyzing the defeat as a rejection of moderation and centrism. This was the reaction of the British Conservatives from 1997-2005, when they chose three hardline Thatcherite Eurosceptics in succession to replace the relatively moderate, and defeated John Major; the US Republican Party is doing much the same by allowing its primaries to be hijacked by the extremist, anti-government Tea Party movement and by providing a dogmatic, uncooperative Congressional opposition. Since 2004, our own right-wing party, the BJP (a party much closer in spirit to the Republicans than the Conservatives), has been in steady decline in every state bar Gujarat, Karnataka and Madhya Pradesh. Unlike the aforementioned parties, the BJP's shift to the right was not unified or coherent. This is partly because of the nature of Indian politics, where individual state leaders have a fairly substantial amount of leeway on policy issues. In general, however, the BJP has looked rightwards, to its "moral authority", the RSS.
The revival of RSS influence was most evident in late 2009/early 2010, when Lal Krishna Advani- one of the greatest ironies of Indian politics today is the fact that Advani has become representative of the "moderate" side of the BJP- retired from all party posts, and Rajnath Singh was replaced as party president by Nitin Gadkari, every bit the RSS' choice.
Since then, we have seen the RSS is clearly not in control of the BJP- but neither is anybody else. Most recently, there appear to be two main factions. Modi and Advani, incredibly, have a loose anti-RSS alliance. Yes, this is one of the most absurd developments in the history of Indian politics, but it is true. Two politicians who most of us believed RSS men for life are now committed to limiting the older organization's influence on the political party. In Modi's case, this is evidently because he sees the RSS as a threat to his own future leadership, inasmuch as it acts to prevent any one figure having total control of the party.
The dispute between the two factions, and Modi and Advani's upper hand is visible in the nomination of Ram Jethmalani, no friend of the RSS, to the Rajya Sabha on a BJP ticket. Only six years ago the octogenarian Jethmalani, with the support of the Congress, fought a Lok Sabha election against no less an RSS and BJP icon than Atal Behari Vajpayee (surely earning himself some brownie points with Advani in the process). Today, however, Jethmalani is Modi's lawyer, and his nomination over the objections of the RSS is a considerable victory for Modi. The failure of Gadkari to inspire, and Modi's consolidation of his own position seems to indicate only one likely path for the BJP: Modi as national leader. His one serious rival for this post will be neither Gadkari nor the Delhi-based parliamentary leadership (Sushma Swaraj and Arun Jaitley, neither of whom are or will ever be true mass leaders), but the Madhya Pradesh CM Shivraj Singh Chauhan, the only other enduringly popular BJP CM (contrary to what the pro-BJP blogs will tell you, Karnataka CM BS Yeddyurappa is not widely popular, with good reason).
Those of us who long for a viable (and palatable) opposition to the corrupt and increasingly complacent Congres should hope that it is Chauhan, and not Modi, who rises to national leadership, however unlikely this prospect may currently appear. Recent events have confirmed what I already suspected: that Modi, whatever his other flaws, is utterly ill-equipped to handle the dynamics of coalition politics. "Coalition dharma" has become a cliché associated in the public eye with Vajpayee, but this particular cliché is only part-imaginary. Vajpayee replaced Advani as party leader in part because of the latter's connection to the Jain hawala scandal, but also, with the reality that as a party limited to certain parts of the country, the BJP was inevitably reliant on alliances with smaller parties. Vajpayee was always the only BJP leader entirely agreeable to such formal and informal allies as Naveen Patnaik, Chandrababu Naidu and Nitish Kumar. He had a lifelong ability to make friendships across the political spectrum (in stark contrast to the crudely partisan Modi), but also an understanding of the fact that the BJP's allies needed to be treated with respect and discretion. "Coalition dharma" is not only about ideological compromise: something that Modi might be surprisingly capable of achieving, as his desire for power certainly exceeds his attachment to any particular policy principle. It entails a relationship between parties that should never be paternalistic or condescending. The BJP may have had well over 60% of the MPs in the NDA government of 1998-2004, but its allies were generally accorded a remarkable degree of respect. In retrospect, Chandrababu Naidu has argued that his party was irrevocably tainted by its support of the BJP. But for those six years, the vast majority of BJP allies were more than satisfied with the arrangement. The one prominent ally to defect, the DMK, did so for purely instrumental reasons.
The history of the NDA since 2004 shows us that, in the absence of Vajpayee's leadership, the only reliable ally that the BJP has left is the Shiv Sena, a party in terminal decline following the establishment of Raj Thackeray's MNS. The Trinamool Congress and Biju Janata Dal have both proved emphatically that they can thrive without the BJP; both parties, along with the TDP, are probably lost to the BJP forever, if there is such a thing in Indian politics. The BJP's failure to retain Om Prakash Chautala can be put down to its non-application of "coalition dharma".
Narendra Modi has never had to stoop to a coalition: favourable circumstances, an ineffectual opposition and his own political skill have ensured BJP dominance in Gujarat for the last decade. Vajpayee, by contrast, had first-hand experience of coalition government from his time as Minister of External Affairs in the ramshackle Janata government. Modi, on the other hand, is equipped neither with the experience nor with the temperament for coalition government. He has always embodied a stye of leadership that is based on strong personal direction, not consensus. There is only one prominent BJP leader in Gujarat, and that is Modi (contrast Karnataka, where Ananth Kumar and the Reddy brothers are often as powerful and as visible as the CM).
But there is no need to extrapolate from Modi's style and psyche the conclusion that he would be unable to sustain a coalition. One merely has to examine his record in this regard. Through arrogance and intransigence, Modi is singlehandedly wrecking the once-harmonious but now fragile, yet immensely important alliance with Nitish Kumar's Janata Dal (United). This blog has argued in the past that Nitish is India's best Chief Minister, and he presents the kind of development-oriented alternative to Congress populism that the BJP ought to emulate. The travesty that is Bihar's polity, where even a record of governance as outstanding as Nitish' is not necessarily sufficient to ensure re-election, means that Nitish may even lose to some combination of Laloo and Paswan this winter. But if the BJP loses him they will be shut out of Bihar altogether: the party will have been reduced to a virtual non-factor in five of India's six largest states. Only the truly deluded can believe that Modi's "charismatic" leadership is capable of reversing this. If the BJP is to survive, it needs to both unite internally as well as carefully preserve and reconstruct its state-based alliances. If the party turns to Narendra Modi as its saviour, this latter task will prove impossible: and isolation will be the first step on the path to oblivion.
The revival of RSS influence was most evident in late 2009/early 2010, when Lal Krishna Advani- one of the greatest ironies of Indian politics today is the fact that Advani has become representative of the "moderate" side of the BJP- retired from all party posts, and Rajnath Singh was replaced as party president by Nitin Gadkari, every bit the RSS' choice.
Since then, we have seen the RSS is clearly not in control of the BJP- but neither is anybody else. Most recently, there appear to be two main factions. Modi and Advani, incredibly, have a loose anti-RSS alliance. Yes, this is one of the most absurd developments in the history of Indian politics, but it is true. Two politicians who most of us believed RSS men for life are now committed to limiting the older organization's influence on the political party. In Modi's case, this is evidently because he sees the RSS as a threat to his own future leadership, inasmuch as it acts to prevent any one figure having total control of the party.
The dispute between the two factions, and Modi and Advani's upper hand is visible in the nomination of Ram Jethmalani, no friend of the RSS, to the Rajya Sabha on a BJP ticket. Only six years ago the octogenarian Jethmalani, with the support of the Congress, fought a Lok Sabha election against no less an RSS and BJP icon than Atal Behari Vajpayee (surely earning himself some brownie points with Advani in the process). Today, however, Jethmalani is Modi's lawyer, and his nomination over the objections of the RSS is a considerable victory for Modi. The failure of Gadkari to inspire, and Modi's consolidation of his own position seems to indicate only one likely path for the BJP: Modi as national leader. His one serious rival for this post will be neither Gadkari nor the Delhi-based parliamentary leadership (Sushma Swaraj and Arun Jaitley, neither of whom are or will ever be true mass leaders), but the Madhya Pradesh CM Shivraj Singh Chauhan, the only other enduringly popular BJP CM (contrary to what the pro-BJP blogs will tell you, Karnataka CM BS Yeddyurappa is not widely popular, with good reason).
Those of us who long for a viable (and palatable) opposition to the corrupt and increasingly complacent Congres should hope that it is Chauhan, and not Modi, who rises to national leadership, however unlikely this prospect may currently appear. Recent events have confirmed what I already suspected: that Modi, whatever his other flaws, is utterly ill-equipped to handle the dynamics of coalition politics. "Coalition dharma" has become a cliché associated in the public eye with Vajpayee, but this particular cliché is only part-imaginary. Vajpayee replaced Advani as party leader in part because of the latter's connection to the Jain hawala scandal, but also, with the reality that as a party limited to certain parts of the country, the BJP was inevitably reliant on alliances with smaller parties. Vajpayee was always the only BJP leader entirely agreeable to such formal and informal allies as Naveen Patnaik, Chandrababu Naidu and Nitish Kumar. He had a lifelong ability to make friendships across the political spectrum (in stark contrast to the crudely partisan Modi), but also an understanding of the fact that the BJP's allies needed to be treated with respect and discretion. "Coalition dharma" is not only about ideological compromise: something that Modi might be surprisingly capable of achieving, as his desire for power certainly exceeds his attachment to any particular policy principle. It entails a relationship between parties that should never be paternalistic or condescending. The BJP may have had well over 60% of the MPs in the NDA government of 1998-2004, but its allies were generally accorded a remarkable degree of respect. In retrospect, Chandrababu Naidu has argued that his party was irrevocably tainted by its support of the BJP. But for those six years, the vast majority of BJP allies were more than satisfied with the arrangement. The one prominent ally to defect, the DMK, did so for purely instrumental reasons.
The history of the NDA since 2004 shows us that, in the absence of Vajpayee's leadership, the only reliable ally that the BJP has left is the Shiv Sena, a party in terminal decline following the establishment of Raj Thackeray's MNS. The Trinamool Congress and Biju Janata Dal have both proved emphatically that they can thrive without the BJP; both parties, along with the TDP, are probably lost to the BJP forever, if there is such a thing in Indian politics. The BJP's failure to retain Om Prakash Chautala can be put down to its non-application of "coalition dharma".
Narendra Modi has never had to stoop to a coalition: favourable circumstances, an ineffectual opposition and his own political skill have ensured BJP dominance in Gujarat for the last decade. Vajpayee, by contrast, had first-hand experience of coalition government from his time as Minister of External Affairs in the ramshackle Janata government. Modi, on the other hand, is equipped neither with the experience nor with the temperament for coalition government. He has always embodied a stye of leadership that is based on strong personal direction, not consensus. There is only one prominent BJP leader in Gujarat, and that is Modi (contrast Karnataka, where Ananth Kumar and the Reddy brothers are often as powerful and as visible as the CM).
But there is no need to extrapolate from Modi's style and psyche the conclusion that he would be unable to sustain a coalition. One merely has to examine his record in this regard. Through arrogance and intransigence, Modi is singlehandedly wrecking the once-harmonious but now fragile, yet immensely important alliance with Nitish Kumar's Janata Dal (United). This blog has argued in the past that Nitish is India's best Chief Minister, and he presents the kind of development-oriented alternative to Congress populism that the BJP ought to emulate. The travesty that is Bihar's polity, where even a record of governance as outstanding as Nitish' is not necessarily sufficient to ensure re-election, means that Nitish may even lose to some combination of Laloo and Paswan this winter. But if the BJP loses him they will be shut out of Bihar altogether: the party will have been reduced to a virtual non-factor in five of India's six largest states. Only the truly deluded can believe that Modi's "charismatic" leadership is capable of reversing this. If the BJP is to survive, it needs to both unite internally as well as carefully preserve and reconstruct its state-based alliances. If the party turns to Narendra Modi as its saviour, this latter task will prove impossible: and isolation will be the first step on the path to oblivion.
Friday, January 16, 2009
Gujju Bhai?
In response to Keshava's post 'The Serpent's Kiss' (1/14/2009)
I am no fan of Narendra Modi. I am no fan of his politics, of his economics, of his cultural views. I feel it is a travesty that he has not been brought to book for his role, or lack thereof, in the riots of 2002. It worries me that people are looking to Modi for leadership, that people are pointing to him as a future Prime Minister. And the reason it worries me is that I feel the possibility of his becoming Prime Minister is not the wishful thinking of the middle class, or of Gujrat, or of our industrialists. I think it is a very real possibility. And here's why.
Keshava believes that '(Modi) would do well to ditch his corporate backers in favour of a less vocal but far more important person: the Indian voter'. He also believes that that 'his assertion of Gujrati identity (is) the single biggest factor contributing to his current success'. I disagree with both statements.
Narendra Modi became Chief Minister of Gujrat in 2001. He recently became the first CM of Gujrat to win a third successive term. He is also the longest serving CM of the state ever. His support comes not only from the business class, or the middle class or the cities, but also from the tribal belts of Eastern Gujrat, from the economically backward regions of Kutch. He has survived a large scale rebellion within his own party, survived a revitalised Sonia Gandhi in the 2007 election, survived the most important test of all-the test of the voter. Indeed he has not merely survived, not merely endured. He has triumphed. Modi does not need to ditch his corporate backers in favour of the voter because he is able to cultivate both of them, at the same time.
Narendra Modi has triumphed time and again in his home state not merely because he has appealed to the notion of a masculine sense of Gujrati pride. Sure he uses the Gujrat card often. But the use of this 'Gujrat card' cannot explain his consecutive victories in that state. Indeed if we were to follow the logic that playing the politics of regional pride wins you elections, then the Shiv Sena should defeat anti-incumbency in Maharashtra, the Akalis should do this in Punjab, the AGP in Assam, and so on. After all, these parties too campaign on a plank of a regional pride. But anti-incumbency has got the better of these parties time and again. There is obviously more to Narendra Modi than his Gujrati identity
I would argue that Modi has triumphed because he has made every test a referendum on himself-on his personality and his achievements. He has projected himself as a fiery speaker, as an incorruptible, decisive leader capable of taking risks and trusting in his own judgement. He has also been able to deliver on certain 'development' issues. Many bureaucrats working in 'Modi's Gujrat' feel that they can accomplish more there than in perhaps any other part of the country. The image that Modi has projected of himself has given rise to a personality cult-the cult of Moditva, as symbolised by the popularity of the Modi masks in the elections of 2007.
I have differentiated between Narendra Modi's Gujrati identity and his personality. There are many who would be unwilling to draw this distinction. However I turn again to the election of 2007 to point out that these differences do exist. In that election, we saw Sonia Gandhi and Digvijay Singh launching spirited attacks on Modi, calling him 'Merchant of Death' on the one hand, and accusing him of 'Hindu terrorism' on the other. Modi responded in a brilliant counter-attack, and made the entire election about himself. Sonia Gandhi was projected not as anti-Gujrat, but anti-Modi. Keshubhai Patel and other BJP rebels were attacked on a similar plank. The issue of Gujrat receded into the background and Moditva came to the fore.
The question is whether Narendra Modi's Gujrat model can be replicated in the rest of India. The answer to that question lies in what you feel is central to that model. If you feel that it is the usage of Gujrati identity, then the answer is no. If indeed Narendra Modi is no more than a glorified Raj Thackeray or Shibu Soren then he will remain a phenomenon inside Gujrat and perhaps in some other states like the Gujrati speaking areas of Maharashtra. But if you feel that the Gujrat model has at its core the Modi personality, as I do, then you must admit the potential for Modi to become a leader of considerable national standing. Pratap Bhanu Mehta identifies this in brilliant article written in the aftermath of Modi's last election victory in December 2007. Already Modi has drawn huge crowds at rallies in Mumbai and as far away as Chennai, and although I am not suggesting that the BJP is about to win many seats in Tamil Nadu, I do feel that the Modi factor will be an important part of the elections of 2009. Indeed, these elections offer a chance for Modi to actualise his considerable potential (apologies for the use of Aristotelian language).
Note: In his post, Keshava has consigned the TDP to the dustbin of history, along with the Swatantra Party. I am sure he has good reasons for doing so. However, while Swatantra is well and truly dead, I wouldn't be so sure to write off the TDP yet. The elections this summer may just signal a revival of fortunes for the beleaguered Chandrababu Naidu.
I am no fan of Narendra Modi. I am no fan of his politics, of his economics, of his cultural views. I feel it is a travesty that he has not been brought to book for his role, or lack thereof, in the riots of 2002. It worries me that people are looking to Modi for leadership, that people are pointing to him as a future Prime Minister. And the reason it worries me is that I feel the possibility of his becoming Prime Minister is not the wishful thinking of the middle class, or of Gujrat, or of our industrialists. I think it is a very real possibility. And here's why.
Keshava believes that '(Modi) would do well to ditch his corporate backers in favour of a less vocal but far more important person: the Indian voter'. He also believes that that 'his assertion of Gujrati identity (is) the single biggest factor contributing to his current success'. I disagree with both statements.
Narendra Modi became Chief Minister of Gujrat in 2001. He recently became the first CM of Gujrat to win a third successive term. He is also the longest serving CM of the state ever. His support comes not only from the business class, or the middle class or the cities, but also from the tribal belts of Eastern Gujrat, from the economically backward regions of Kutch. He has survived a large scale rebellion within his own party, survived a revitalised Sonia Gandhi in the 2007 election, survived the most important test of all-the test of the voter. Indeed he has not merely survived, not merely endured. He has triumphed. Modi does not need to ditch his corporate backers in favour of the voter because he is able to cultivate both of them, at the same time.
Narendra Modi has triumphed time and again in his home state not merely because he has appealed to the notion of a masculine sense of Gujrati pride. Sure he uses the Gujrat card often. But the use of this 'Gujrat card' cannot explain his consecutive victories in that state. Indeed if we were to follow the logic that playing the politics of regional pride wins you elections, then the Shiv Sena should defeat anti-incumbency in Maharashtra, the Akalis should do this in Punjab, the AGP in Assam, and so on. After all, these parties too campaign on a plank of a regional pride. But anti-incumbency has got the better of these parties time and again. There is obviously more to Narendra Modi than his Gujrati identity
I would argue that Modi has triumphed because he has made every test a referendum on himself-on his personality and his achievements. He has projected himself as a fiery speaker, as an incorruptible, decisive leader capable of taking risks and trusting in his own judgement. He has also been able to deliver on certain 'development' issues. Many bureaucrats working in 'Modi's Gujrat' feel that they can accomplish more there than in perhaps any other part of the country. The image that Modi has projected of himself has given rise to a personality cult-the cult of Moditva, as symbolised by the popularity of the Modi masks in the elections of 2007.
I have differentiated between Narendra Modi's Gujrati identity and his personality. There are many who would be unwilling to draw this distinction. However I turn again to the election of 2007 to point out that these differences do exist. In that election, we saw Sonia Gandhi and Digvijay Singh launching spirited attacks on Modi, calling him 'Merchant of Death' on the one hand, and accusing him of 'Hindu terrorism' on the other. Modi responded in a brilliant counter-attack, and made the entire election about himself. Sonia Gandhi was projected not as anti-Gujrat, but anti-Modi. Keshubhai Patel and other BJP rebels were attacked on a similar plank. The issue of Gujrat receded into the background and Moditva came to the fore.
The question is whether Narendra Modi's Gujrat model can be replicated in the rest of India. The answer to that question lies in what you feel is central to that model. If you feel that it is the usage of Gujrati identity, then the answer is no. If indeed Narendra Modi is no more than a glorified Raj Thackeray or Shibu Soren then he will remain a phenomenon inside Gujrat and perhaps in some other states like the Gujrati speaking areas of Maharashtra. But if you feel that the Gujrat model has at its core the Modi personality, as I do, then you must admit the potential for Modi to become a leader of considerable national standing. Pratap Bhanu Mehta identifies this in brilliant article written in the aftermath of Modi's last election victory in December 2007. Already Modi has drawn huge crowds at rallies in Mumbai and as far away as Chennai, and although I am not suggesting that the BJP is about to win many seats in Tamil Nadu, I do feel that the Modi factor will be an important part of the elections of 2009. Indeed, these elections offer a chance for Modi to actualise his considerable potential (apologies for the use of Aristotelian language).
Note: In his post, Keshava has consigned the TDP to the dustbin of history, along with the Swatantra Party. I am sure he has good reasons for doing so. However, while Swatantra is well and truly dead, I wouldn't be so sure to write off the TDP yet. The elections this summer may just signal a revival of fortunes for the beleaguered Chandrababu Naidu.
Wednesday, January 14, 2009
The serpent's kiss
The Hindustan Times reports on the glowing tributes issued in Gujarat CM Narendra Modi's favour by leading industrialists at an investors' summit in Delhi. Anil Ambani, who lost more of his wealth in 2008 than any other individual, wished that "Narendrabhai" be "the next leader of the country", while Sunil Mittal hailed this "CEO" who "can run the nation". Praise even came from less expected quarters, such as Ratan Tata, who is often regarded with Narayana Murthy as a model captain of industry.
Some of Modi's BJP colleagues joined in the gibbering, with an anonymous functionary claiming that the party would win 30% more seats if it declared Modi as its prime ministerial candidate. And the TV-watching middle class have, to a large extent, been calling for this very act for some time.
If one were to go by such media reports, it might seem obvious that Modi is indeed a future Prime Minister. But I'm not quite so sure. Recent history shows us that corporate support is no guarantor of success. If anything, quite the opposite. The first Indian politician to describe himself as a CEO was Chandrababu Naidu, who less than a decade later lies ruined and forgotten, his party machinery destroyed by the Congress' agrarian base. SM Krishna, the man who promised to make Bangalore into Singapore through his partnerships with the IT industry, fared little better. Buddhadeb Bhattacharya is more secure, but his coddling of industrialists did more to hurt the CPM in West Bengal than any previous action of the party. Look further back in history, and the example of Swatantra, a party which had large swathes of corporate backing, is another illuminating one.
Narendra Modi will never be Prime Minister until he can broaden his appeal to include a majority of Indians. His popularity at present is restricted to the aforementioned businessmen and middle-class, Gujarati Hindus, and Hindutvawadis in two of three other states. His assertion of the Gujarati identity, the single biggest contributing factor to his current success, will not take him particularly far. He would do well to ditch his corporate backers in favour of a less vocal but far more important person: the Indian voter. The average voter couldn't care less about FDIs, growth rates or terrorism. In most districts, even Hindutva no longer really cuts it. Until Modi can transcend these differences, he is likely to meet as sticky an end as Swatantra and the TDP. If only those who the gods love die young, then the gods in question here are clearly the men that Indian newspapers delight in calling "India Inc".
Some of Modi's BJP colleagues joined in the gibbering, with an anonymous functionary claiming that the party would win 30% more seats if it declared Modi as its prime ministerial candidate. And the TV-watching middle class have, to a large extent, been calling for this very act for some time.
If one were to go by such media reports, it might seem obvious that Modi is indeed a future Prime Minister. But I'm not quite so sure. Recent history shows us that corporate support is no guarantor of success. If anything, quite the opposite. The first Indian politician to describe himself as a CEO was Chandrababu Naidu, who less than a decade later lies ruined and forgotten, his party machinery destroyed by the Congress' agrarian base. SM Krishna, the man who promised to make Bangalore into Singapore through his partnerships with the IT industry, fared little better. Buddhadeb Bhattacharya is more secure, but his coddling of industrialists did more to hurt the CPM in West Bengal than any previous action of the party. Look further back in history, and the example of Swatantra, a party which had large swathes of corporate backing, is another illuminating one.
Narendra Modi will never be Prime Minister until he can broaden his appeal to include a majority of Indians. His popularity at present is restricted to the aforementioned businessmen and middle-class, Gujarati Hindus, and Hindutvawadis in two of three other states. His assertion of the Gujarati identity, the single biggest contributing factor to his current success, will not take him particularly far. He would do well to ditch his corporate backers in favour of a less vocal but far more important person: the Indian voter. The average voter couldn't care less about FDIs, growth rates or terrorism. In most districts, even Hindutva no longer really cuts it. Until Modi can transcend these differences, he is likely to meet as sticky an end as Swatantra and the TDP. If only those who the gods love die young, then the gods in question here are clearly the men that Indian newspapers delight in calling "India Inc".
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