Bloody Borders

That India lived in a dangerous neighbourhood has long been known, and in case we needed any reminder of the fact, we only have to look at events of the last week. The security situation in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Pakistan all took a turn for the worse and there seems little prospect of a compensating upward swing in the near future.

1)Pakistan

I do not remember the last time I heard good news coming out of Pakistan. First the government effectively handed over sovereignty to the Taliban in the valley of Swat, in a move that is widely being seen as a precursor to wider government abdication in FATA and Baluchistan. Many commentators have claimed, and I think justly, that to negotiate with the Taliban is futile, and that the only way to beat them is through a combination of judicial military strikes and a systematic eroding of their support base. Currently the opposite is happening-a rather simplified reading of the situation could be as follows: the CIA with the help of the ISI is attacking targets with drones, something that minimizes risk to American lives but which serves more often than not to kill innocent civilians, thereby validating the Jihadi cause. Certainly, there is no sense in handing over the fate of hundreds of thousands of people to a quasi-terrorist group and then hoping that the group will be satisfied with what they've got. The best description of the deal that I have come across is one provided by Brahma Chellaney-he calls it a faustian bargain. I have said before that Pakistan is playing with fire when it promotes Jihadi elements, but in this case it seems as if Pakistan is willfully walking down the path of self destruction. Whose side is the ISI on? And what do the people of Pakistan want? A Pakistani Taliban sitting in Islamabad? And as the Taliban in Pakistan goes from strength to strength, the Pakistani politicians continue to try to outdo each other in terms of incompetence. Nawaz Sharif has been banned from contesting elections by the current administration, in what seems like a desperate bid by the increasingly unpopular Asif Zardari to stay in power. Unless the politicians of Punjab and Sindh can bridge the divide that separates them and provide courageous, farsighted leadership, there seems little hope for Pakistan.

2)Sri Lanka

The Rajapakse government is gloating over its military success against a somewhat beleaguered and it seems, rather tired, LTTE. Now I am no fan of V Prabhakaran or his organization. I think that they have almost as much to harm the cause of Sri Lankan Tamils as decades of Sinhalese discrimination. This is evident in the manner in which they have forcibly radicalized Tamil civil society, driving away, or worse, assassinating, moderate Tamils; and in their insistence on putting all their faith in a military solution. They have also ensured, with the killing of Rajiv Gandhi, that never again will the Indian government actively support the cause for Eelam. However I have no patience for President Rajapakse either. He is the embodiment of Sinhalese chauvinism and his complete lack of faith in the negotiation process smacks of an attempt to bully his way out of a long standing crisis. The unabated military action against the LTTE has created an unprecedented humanitarian disaster in Sri Lanka, and one wonders why, if people like Omar Bashir of Sudan can be accused of war crimes, President Rajapakse cannot. Moreover, I am forced to wonder how successful this action will be. Countless examples, from Gaza to Kashmir, prove that the use of disproportionate force on an opponent that is capable of hiding behind civilians, only creates more trouble. I would not be surprised in the LTTE goes underground once again, and continues its struggle from there. The Tamils of Sri Lanka have not taken up arms for no reason, and while I do not condone the excesses of the LTTE, I do believe that it is impossible to beat into subjugation those who are fighting for their inalienable rights of citizenship. Ultimately, the situation in Sri Lanka can only be solved through a protracted cease fire and negotiated settlement. The military success of the Sri Lankan army only makes this possibility seem more remote than ever before.

3) Bangladesh

The Sheikh Hasina government met with its first major challenge as sections of the army mutinied over salary issues. The mutiny has since been put down, but it points to a wider problem inherent in Bangladeshi affairs. The Bangladeshi army is radicalized outfit, and one suspects that the salary, low as it is, served as a cover for the soldiers. Sheikh Hasina has pledged to tackle extremist organizations that have found safe haven in Bangladesh and it is likely that sections of the army do not wholly approve of this step.

What are the implications of events in neighbouring countries on India? The answer is, in one word, profound. The treatment of Tamils in Sri Lanka and the Indian governments failure to provide a coherent plan to assist them will be a major poll issue in Tamil Nadu. It may force the DMK to sever its links with the Congress as it attempts to battle anti-incumbency and retain as many seats as possible. This in turn could push the Congress towards the AIADMK, which is widely expected to perform well in these elections. On a broader foreign policy level, the actions of the Sri Lankan government and the subsequent Indian reaction point to a increasing irrelevance of India in Sri Lankan affairs. India, while refraining from supporting the LTTE, must make a strong case for a cease fire and a return to the negotiating table. The government must stop trying to compete with China in aiding Rajapakse, and instead take a harder line on him, criticizing him for his unilateral escalation of force. India must push for a solution whereby the Tamils either get a semi-autonomous state, or equal cultural rights within the Sri Lankan union. This is not meddling in the internal affairs of another country-this is acting in one's own best interest, with the view that foreign policy cannot and should not be alienated from domestic policy.

Bangladesh provides a different, but in some ways more palatable challenge. Sheikh Hasina is openly pro-India, and she has earned a huge mandate from her people. The opportunity is ripe for the Indian government to strengthen Indo-Bangla ties by investing heavily in infrastructure development in that country, bolstering trade, and working to ensure that Bangladeshi civil society does not fall under the influence of radical Islamic groups. What is important is that India plays a proactive role in this regard, and does not merely provide nominal assistance to the Hasina government.

Pakistan offers the most pressing challenge to Indian foreign policy. There is a general idea that democracy is a good thing and must be bolstered, but if the parties that make up Pakistani democracy are hell bent on destroying the system that provides them the forum to survive, there is really not much India can do. As a result, I believe India must keep its demands few and consistent-the Taliban must be opposed at all costs, the civilian government must muster the courage to take on pro-Jihadi elements within the administration and ultimately must move to maintain the moderate nature of Pakistani civil society.

Evidently India faces a number of foreign policy challenges. South Block can't complain of being underemployed.

The Big Picture

The journalist Siddhart Vardarajan recently talked to some students at Yale on a variety of topics pertaining to current affairs in India. Here's the crux of what he had to say:

1) On the Mumbai Terror Attack:

Evidence points to Pakistan-of that there is no doubt. But which Pakistan? Vardarajan pointed out that there are many competing groups within Pakistan-the army, the ISI, the Jihadis, the political parties, civil society-and that it is likely that the terror attack did not have the sanction of the civilian government. Instead, the common belief seems to be Jehadi groups within Pakistan working with some elements within the army and the ISI carried out the attack. The phrase 'Jihadi groups' points to LeT, but what is interesting is that the LeT is no longer working as an independent Jihadi group. Rather there is clear evidence that it has developed ties with the Pakistani Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives working on the western border. This explains the targeting of Americans and Jews, something that LeT is not known to have done in the past. Keeping these new ties between the LeT and other Jihadi groups in mind, Vardarajan espouses a rather complex motive behind the attacks. He believes that the attacks took place to create tension between India and Pakistan, which would force Pakistan to pull troops out of the western front and move them to the Indian border, thereby relieving some pressure on the Pakistani Taliban and Al Qaeda.

2) On India-Pakistan relations:

Despite the recent positive developments in Indo-Pak relations (after reaching a low in December-January), Vardarajan is fairly pessimistic about the relations between the two countries over the next few years (although he does say that all out war is unlikely). The primary reason for this is the nexus between the LeT and the Taliban. As long as this nexus is allowed to thrive in Pakistan, terrorist attacks will continue in India and this will prevent a substantial improvement of relations. Vardarajan believes that Pakistan will not crack down on Jihadi groups largely because once the Americans leave Afghanistan (which is bound to happen at some time), they want to ensure that they have a tried and tested Jihadi apparatus left to fill the power vacuum.

3) On the upcoming elections:

The short answer seems to be: the UPA is coming back. Also look out for a resurgent AIADMK, TDP, BSP and a still powerful Left. Neither the UPA nor the NDA will get more than 200 seats, so third front support will be essential. Vardarajan has great faith in the Indian voter. He believes they will reject divisive politics, that deep down they think the BJP is responsible for the growth in terrorism, that they recognize the NREGS is a central scheme, that they are not swayed by the theory of anti-incumbency.

And now for some of my views:

1) I agree primarily with much of Vardarajan has to say on foreign policy (who am I not to). However one major issue I have with him is his determination to separate the Kashmir issue from the Mumbai attacks. He claimed that because of the convergence of Indian and Pakistani views on Kashmir in the last 5 years, Kashmir was not the reason why Mumbai was attacked. However, if we are to believe that the Jihadi groups were primarily responsible for the attack, and not an official wing of the Pakistani establishment, then I wonder how easy it is to isolate Kashmir entirely. Certainly Jihadi groups have a motive in getting Pakistani troops away from the Afghan border, but I think the more pressing reason for the attack is as follows: Jihadi groups wanted to derail the peace process and strengthen extremist groups in India (namely the BJP). The timing of the attack-just before a round of state elections, points to this fact. Presumably, the terrorists felt that the attacks would result in the Indian public taking a hard line and sweeping the BJP into power. Why would they want this to happen? Because groups like the BJP were primarily responsible for the huge azadi demonstrations that took place in Kashmir last summer-remember the Amarnath controversy? The relationship between a strong BJP and popular discontent in Kashmir seems to be a direct one, and this is of great benefit to groups like the LeT, which receive much of their funding and popular support due to their stand on the Kashmir issue.

2) Vardarajan is certainly spot on when he comes to predicting the future of Indo-Pak relations. Until Pakistan dismantles its carefully constructed Jihadi framework, terror attacks will continue in India and relations will remain sour. What is baffling is why Pakistani officialdom does not crack down on the Jihadis. Recent events in Swat, where the government has effectively ceded administration to the Jihadi groups, points to the fact that the Pakistani authorities have created a Frankenstein monster. It is quite possible that their obsession to control Afghan domestic affairs and hurt India with a thousand small cuts (the two primary reasons for the creation of the Jihadi apparatus) at the same time will lead to Pakistan itself being consumed by the Jihadi fireball.

3) On the issue of the general elections, I believe that Vardarajan may indeed have got it wrong. The UPA may come back-I don't deny it. But to say that the Indian voter will turn away from the BJP because of divisive politics or that most voters recognize NREGS to be a central scheme is, I believe, wrong. The BJP is stronger than ever in states like Gujrat and Karnataka despite shockingly divisive politics. Just because Delhi did not fall under the spell of divisive politics does not mean that the BJP's style of functioning has no appeal. As for the question of NREGS, Vardarajan believes that the BJP lost in Rajasthan because people recognized NREGS to be a central scheme. I believe that the primary reason for the BJP's defeat was not this however. Rather I think that the abrasive personality politics employed by Vasundhara Raje turned a lot of people off and created divisions within her party, which led to her defeat. Moreover, even if the people of Rajasthan looked at NREGS as a Central scheme, the people of MP and Chattisgarh certainly did not. Indeed the fact that the BJP won in MP and Chattisgarh, thus defying anti-incumbency, does mean something.

Vardarajan also ruled out the possibility of Mayawati becoming PM, saying that she will get not more than 50 seats. I'm not sure how true this is-I believe that she may even get closer to 60. I certainly think she has a reasonable shot at the PM's chair.

Despite my disagreements with Siddharat Vardarajan, I must put on record what a pleasure it was hearing him speak. He is a lucid speaker, certainly knows his stuff, and provides an original insight into a number of issues. I look forward to reading his columns more regularly in future.

In Defence of Indian Idealism

Ashish's strident critique of my somewhat nostalgic characterization of Indo-Palestine relations centred on three points:

1. That Indian support for the Palestinians, like Gandhi's support for the Khilafat movement, was self-interestedly political rather than sympathetic;
2. That the same could be said in general of Indian foreign policy at the time, i.e. non-alignment and our desire to be a leader of the third world;
3. That our current Israel policy and our current foreign policy in general is preferable to our "hypocritical, pedantic" past.

I will respond to these in order. On the first point, I concede that, given the emotional resonance of the Palestinian cause, Congress governments, so often accused of "minority appeasement", might have been keen to play to the sentiments of India's largest minority. But this is only half the story. It is clear from the tone and argument of Gandhi's editorial (which I suspect Ashish has not read) that in his case his opposition to a Jewish national home in Palestine was moral rather than political. As for the leaders of independent India: there is no question that idealism, not self-interested realism, was indeed the dominant ideology of India's foreign policy in the 47-65 period. The two "makers" of Indian foreign policy at the time were Jawaharlal Nehru and VK Krishna Menon, two men whose idealism could at times (especially in the case of Menon) become naivete. India's desire to be a leader of the third world and its unwavering support of the Palestinian cause are entirely in keeping with Nehru and Menon's socialist, anti-colonial ideology, with its special focus on the rights of indigenous people to democratic self-determination.

What, then, of Ashish's third critique? I'm entirely in agreement with him on the question of Israel policy. While the Indian public, or at least its most vocal sections, might desire Israel-style retribution against Pakistan, our government has been commendably thoughtful and balanced in its approach to the issue, in contrast to earlier governments that clearly erred in not recognizing Israel. The greatest improvement in our foreign policy, the post 1980s thaw with the United States, also represents the triumph of a kind of realism (although not necessarily one that conflicts with idealism, given India's economic reforms). But his general point, that our current foreign policy towards the world is preferable to our "hypocritical, pedantic" past is, I believe, mistaken. Nehru certainly made great mistakes, and it is telling that we choose to remember them so much more vividly than his many successes. But the tradition of Indian idealism is infinitely preferable to the current, amoral situation in which we coddle tyrants in Yangon, attempt to play both sides against each other in Sri Lanka and explore the possibility of unholy marriages of convenience with Russia and China. I missed the part where wanting to spread our own democratic freedoms to the rest of the developing world was more "hypocritical" than blowing our own trumpet while simultaneously, like the United States, hindering other countries from sharing in democracy.

Things Have Changed...For the Better

In response to Keshava's post: 'Things Have Changed' (1/9/09)

It is indeed sad that the media and members of the Hindu right are calling for India to launch an Israeli-like strike on Pakistan. Not only are such calls highly irresponsible-(to put it simply, Pakistan is not Gaza), they also betray a shocking admiration for strong arm tactics that are in brazen defiance of international law and basic human morality.

However, to suggest that India should return to a foreign policy that is 'defined by humanity and idealism' and thus 'flawed in the noblest of ways' is a mistake. Indeed, harking back to the past in this case is a mistake on not one but two counts:

Firstly, while the scale of the Israeli action on Gaza is indefensible, but we should not allow this action to disguise the fact that Hamas is not exactly an innocent organization. Military action of any kind, be it the bombing and invasion of Gaza or the rocket attacks on Israel are wrong and must be condemned. Certainly if Hamas had the capability of inflicting more casualties on Israel, they would. However one suspects that the India of the past would not have condemned, or certainly not condemned with equal severity, the actions of both Hamas and Israel. One suspects that the India of old would have taken the line that Hamas is acting as a 'resistance movement, fighting to win back the land of its people'. Such a stand is counter-productive on many counts-it's human nature to cheer the underdog, but the underdog in this case (Hamas) could easily metamorphosise into a repressive regime in its own right, if given the chance. The current governments more guarded response to the conflict must be applauded.

Secondly, I dispute the claim that there was a time 'when the Indian approach to distant global events was defined by humanity and idealism' at all. Indian support for the Palestinian cause may have had some root in genuine sympathy for the Palestinian people, but I believe it originated as a result not of idealism but of self-interest. Indeed I believe that self-interest has been a part of India’s foreign policy towards the Israel-Palestine issue since and indeed before independence. I would argue that India’s support for the Palestinian cause was based on at least two major assumptions:
1) That this support would win over Muslim countries around the world, and particularly in the Arab lands, to Indias side in the UN, the NAM and as a counterweight to Pakistan. Indian support for the Palestinian cause had a lot to do with Indias desire to be a leader of the third world. There are 51 nations with largely Muslim populations, and all of them fell at one time under the banner of the third world.
2) That Indian support for the Palestinian's would win over large portions of the country's own Muslim population. The Hindu right would describe it as appeasement; those in charge of India's foreign policy at the time would view it as a chance to build much needed bridges between an alienated community wondering if it made the right choice to remain in India, and the rest of the country. It doesn’t matter what you call it-in this case, 'appeasement' and 'building bridges' are different names for the same thing. Foreign policy in India has for the longest time been viewed as an extension of domestic policy-one need look back at various events, including Mahatma Gandhi’s unequivocal support for the Khilafat movement (1919), and his decision to define the 'Khilafat wrong' as one of the three central reasons for the launching of the non-cooperation movement, to vindicate this statement. One is forced to question whether Gandhi’s support for the Khilafatis was idealistic-one in fact wonders whether Gandhi personally believed in the Khilafat cause at all. What is certainly true is that he saw the Khilafat movement as an opportunity to include the Muslim community in the wider independence movement. Similarly, one of the reasons for India's support to Palestine was to convince Indian Muslims that India was prepared to stand up for Muslims even in a distant land, and thus reassure them that they were truly safe in India itself.

India’s current stand on the Israel-Palestine issue, which balances a condemnation of the disproportionate use of force by the Israelis as well as the use of violence as a political tool by Hamas on the one hand, and a support for the PLO and a two state solution on the other, is more evolved, responsible and mature than its hypocritical, pedantic past.

Things have changed

The ongoing atrocities in Gaza, and the cloying admiration of Sangh Parivar right-wingers for Israel's military machine (as expressed in the recent New Indian Express front-page headline: "Israel Strikes While India Dithers") led to me recall a time when Indian attitudes to Israelis and Palestinians were radically different to what they are today.

The Indian response to the Jewish Question was led by Gandhi, in a famous article in Harijan in 1938. The Mahatma, while asserting his deep sympathies for the Jews (his disgust at Hitler partly explains his pro-British stance during World War II), took issue with the principles behind Zionism. The Biblical land of Palestine, he contended, was "not a geographical tract"; when other religious groups did not have states based on scriptural promises, why should the Jews? To "partly or wholly" create a Jewish national home in Palestine would be to do a grave injustice to the Arabs. Gandhi asserted that Palestine was as integrally a home to the Arabs as England was to the English and France to the French. Territorial claims and aspirations, he wrote, were to be made on the basis of residence (a literal rather than figurative "home"), not religion.

In the first four decades after independence, the series of Congress governments took their cues on this issue from the Mahatma. On 29 November 1947, India (along with Pakistan) was one of only 13 countries that voted against the UN Partition Plan to create two states and a UN-administered "zone" out of Palestine. India's opposition to the plan was deeply grounded in an opposition to the idea of a Jewish state in Palestine. India, indeed, did not even extend diplomatic recognition to the state of Israel until the early 1990s.

In retrospect, the attitudes of Gandhi and Nehru towards the issue of Palestine were significantly mistaken. By 1947, a third of the population of the region was Jewish, and there were thus territorial claims to a national state that ran deeper than mere textuality. Additionally, the Mahatma gave insufficient consideration to the role that creating a Jewish state would play in redressing the horrors of the Holocaust- after all, Jews had never received humane treatment in Europe, being best treated in, of all places, the Muslim world (prior to the 1920s). Gandhi would, one suspects, have advocated a one-state solution, the creation of an India-type secular state in the region. But I think it is fair to say that since no side was ever acceptable to this idea, it is an unviable one. And in any case, to revisit today the notion that Israel has no right to exist is counterproductive, to say the least.

Nevertheless, the Indian attitude was flawed in the noblest of ways. It showcased a deeply felt concern for the Palestinian Arabs that is a fitting riposte, if any were needed, to the silly claims of those who accuse the founders of the Indian state of being covertly anti-Muslim. Gandhi's distaste for state creation and the dispossession of people on the basis of religion is one that I entirely share. And when the angry middle class and their spokespeople in the media- the irresponsibly shrill Arnab Goswami and Barkha Dutt- demand Israeli-style "retribution"; a demand that is a mere cloak for Islamophobia of the worst kind; it is impossible not to be wistful for a time when the Indian approach to distant global events was defined by humanity and idealism.