The Big Picture

The journalist Siddhart Vardarajan recently talked to some students at Yale on a variety of topics pertaining to current affairs in India. Here's the crux of what he had to say:

1) On the Mumbai Terror Attack:

Evidence points to Pakistan-of that there is no doubt. But which Pakistan? Vardarajan pointed out that there are many competing groups within Pakistan-the army, the ISI, the Jihadis, the political parties, civil society-and that it is likely that the terror attack did not have the sanction of the civilian government. Instead, the common belief seems to be Jehadi groups within Pakistan working with some elements within the army and the ISI carried out the attack. The phrase 'Jihadi groups' points to LeT, but what is interesting is that the LeT is no longer working as an independent Jihadi group. Rather there is clear evidence that it has developed ties with the Pakistani Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives working on the western border. This explains the targeting of Americans and Jews, something that LeT is not known to have done in the past. Keeping these new ties between the LeT and other Jihadi groups in mind, Vardarajan espouses a rather complex motive behind the attacks. He believes that the attacks took place to create tension between India and Pakistan, which would force Pakistan to pull troops out of the western front and move them to the Indian border, thereby relieving some pressure on the Pakistani Taliban and Al Qaeda.

2) On India-Pakistan relations:

Despite the recent positive developments in Indo-Pak relations (after reaching a low in December-January), Vardarajan is fairly pessimistic about the relations between the two countries over the next few years (although he does say that all out war is unlikely). The primary reason for this is the nexus between the LeT and the Taliban. As long as this nexus is allowed to thrive in Pakistan, terrorist attacks will continue in India and this will prevent a substantial improvement of relations. Vardarajan believes that Pakistan will not crack down on Jihadi groups largely because once the Americans leave Afghanistan (which is bound to happen at some time), they want to ensure that they have a tried and tested Jihadi apparatus left to fill the power vacuum.

3) On the upcoming elections:

The short answer seems to be: the UPA is coming back. Also look out for a resurgent AIADMK, TDP, BSP and a still powerful Left. Neither the UPA nor the NDA will get more than 200 seats, so third front support will be essential. Vardarajan has great faith in the Indian voter. He believes they will reject divisive politics, that deep down they think the BJP is responsible for the growth in terrorism, that they recognize the NREGS is a central scheme, that they are not swayed by the theory of anti-incumbency.

And now for some of my views:

1) I agree primarily with much of Vardarajan has to say on foreign policy (who am I not to). However one major issue I have with him is his determination to separate the Kashmir issue from the Mumbai attacks. He claimed that because of the convergence of Indian and Pakistani views on Kashmir in the last 5 years, Kashmir was not the reason why Mumbai was attacked. However, if we are to believe that the Jihadi groups were primarily responsible for the attack, and not an official wing of the Pakistani establishment, then I wonder how easy it is to isolate Kashmir entirely. Certainly Jihadi groups have a motive in getting Pakistani troops away from the Afghan border, but I think the more pressing reason for the attack is as follows: Jihadi groups wanted to derail the peace process and strengthen extremist groups in India (namely the BJP). The timing of the attack-just before a round of state elections, points to this fact. Presumably, the terrorists felt that the attacks would result in the Indian public taking a hard line and sweeping the BJP into power. Why would they want this to happen? Because groups like the BJP were primarily responsible for the huge azadi demonstrations that took place in Kashmir last summer-remember the Amarnath controversy? The relationship between a strong BJP and popular discontent in Kashmir seems to be a direct one, and this is of great benefit to groups like the LeT, which receive much of their funding and popular support due to their stand on the Kashmir issue.

2) Vardarajan is certainly spot on when he comes to predicting the future of Indo-Pak relations. Until Pakistan dismantles its carefully constructed Jihadi framework, terror attacks will continue in India and relations will remain sour. What is baffling is why Pakistani officialdom does not crack down on the Jihadis. Recent events in Swat, where the government has effectively ceded administration to the Jihadi groups, points to the fact that the Pakistani authorities have created a Frankenstein monster. It is quite possible that their obsession to control Afghan domestic affairs and hurt India with a thousand small cuts (the two primary reasons for the creation of the Jihadi apparatus) at the same time will lead to Pakistan itself being consumed by the Jihadi fireball.

3) On the issue of the general elections, I believe that Vardarajan may indeed have got it wrong. The UPA may come back-I don't deny it. But to say that the Indian voter will turn away from the BJP because of divisive politics or that most voters recognize NREGS to be a central scheme is, I believe, wrong. The BJP is stronger than ever in states like Gujrat and Karnataka despite shockingly divisive politics. Just because Delhi did not fall under the spell of divisive politics does not mean that the BJP's style of functioning has no appeal. As for the question of NREGS, Vardarajan believes that the BJP lost in Rajasthan because people recognized NREGS to be a central scheme. I believe that the primary reason for the BJP's defeat was not this however. Rather I think that the abrasive personality politics employed by Vasundhara Raje turned a lot of people off and created divisions within her party, which led to her defeat. Moreover, even if the people of Rajasthan looked at NREGS as a Central scheme, the people of MP and Chattisgarh certainly did not. Indeed the fact that the BJP won in MP and Chattisgarh, thus defying anti-incumbency, does mean something.

Vardarajan also ruled out the possibility of Mayawati becoming PM, saying that she will get not more than 50 seats. I'm not sure how true this is-I believe that she may even get closer to 60. I certainly think she has a reasonable shot at the PM's chair.

Despite my disagreements with Siddharat Vardarajan, I must put on record what a pleasure it was hearing him speak. He is a lucid speaker, certainly knows his stuff, and provides an original insight into a number of issues. I look forward to reading his columns more regularly in future.

About time

It looks like the day when long-overdue international developments finally transpire. Just as Israel prepares to announce a ceasefire in Gaza, Pakistan has finally admitted that India provided it with proof of some Pakistani involvement in the Mumbai terror attacks (The Hindu). I wonder if the mild pressure put on Pakistan by David Milliband had any effect. The Pakistani Interior Minister, Rahman Malik, announced that an internal probe would be launched and the process taken forward through the judiciary. He declined to set a timeframe.

It's too early for any reactions from the Indian side or word on what's next, but I'll be updating regularly as those reactions come in.

Prozac Please

Almost a month and a half after the attacks in Bombay, there seems to be no sign that Pakistan is willing to seriously move on terrorist groups that exist within its borders. Although no one really expected immediate moves in this regard by the Pakistani government, the events that have unfolded since the attack are most likely to leave the informed Indian depressed and decidedly suspicious of Pakistan's willingness to combat 'terror', something it has emphasised time and again.

In particular, the Pakistani government's continuous 'flip-flopping' on major issues and the fact that it is still in official denial of the nationality of the terrorists, (let alone anything else) is hardly likely to build confidence or trust in the minds of the Indian people. Sitting in India, we have watched as President Zardari says one thing on one day, and another on the next. We watched as Nawaz Sharif admitted to Kasab being a Pakistani and then was forced to retract his statement; watched as NSA Durrani was sacked for admitting Kasab was a Pakistani; watched as a prominent Pakistani TV Channel interviewed Kasab's father in a village in Pakistan. We watched as Pakistan dismissed, within a day of receiving, a dossier of evidence that India supplied as 'un-credible'. We have watched this with a mixture of anger and disbelief. And we have debated endlessly about who is in charge of Pakistan and whether or not there is a group in Pakistani politics, however small it may be, which actually wishes to crack down on groups responsible for the attacks. Today the ordinary Indian is none the clearer. Justice seems an unrealistic wish. Perhaps we should just hope that another attack does not happen.

There was a hope that the US would put a decisive amount of pressure on the Pakistani administration to act on the those responsible for the attacks. After all, 6 citizens of the United States had died in the attacks. Yet I believe that ultimately India will have to fight Her battles alone-no one will fight them for us. As long as Pakistan can use its active participation in the war against the Taliban on the Afghan border as a bargaining chip with the United States, the US is unlikely to weigh in strongly on India's side.

The US is clearly stuck between a rock and a hard place when it comes to policy on Pakistan. Pakistani action against the Taliban is moderate at best. It is my belief that the Pakistani administration still sees the Taliban as its best bet in Afghanistan. Certainly, the current government, with its strong Indian ties (India has pumped an unprecedented amount of aid into Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, and we have a consular presence in not one but five Afghan cities), and determination to destroy Taliban havens inside Pakistan, does not enjoy strong ties with the Pakistani. Yet the US cannot really act against Pakistan because without its cooperation, the war against the Taliban is impossible to wage. As long as Pakistan does not provoke India into resorting to military action, what it does with India is of secondary concern to the US. Yet one cant help but feel that the sooner the US realises that fighting terrorism in one corner of a country and condoning it another is hardly going to make you win a war, the better is for not only them, but the international community at large.

I do not really fault the action of our government in the aftermath of the Bombay attacks. We have taken a fairly consistent line, and barring the notable exception of A R Antulay, politicians across the spectrum have spoken in a fairly united voice. To bomb Pakistan, as many enraged Indians had called for, would have been a most irresponsible step, for obvious reasons. Instead India must persist with the diplomatic offensive on Pakistan. The difficult decision that India must take pertains to policy in the long run. Should India take the 'hard line' and say no movement on anything else until the terrorists are brought to book, or the more 'moderate line' which would involve maintaining the demand for justice while ultimately looking to reinvigorate the peace process. Both sides have legitimate arguments for and against. To briefly outline one: going back on the peace process is something that the terrorists arguably want, and thus a sort of 'reward' for their actions. However persisting with the peace process despite various attacks is something India has tried before with little tangible result, save the regular punctuation of bomb blasts in our cities.

While the Pakistani administration may gloat over India's perceived helplessness, what is clear is that it is playing with fire. Increasingly large parts of Pakistan are no go zones for Pakistanis themselves. Pakistani cities are bombed fairly regularly too. World confidence in Pakistan's reliability as a partner in the war on terror is dwindling. Indeed, Pakistan is slowly burning its bridges with the rest of the world, in a bid to satisfy what seems like a political obsession with an anti-India policy. In an attempt to inflict a thousand small cuts on India, one can only hope, for their sake, that they don't inflict a mortal wound on themselves, and change the very character of the society in which they live. One can't help but feel that good relations with India should be a goal for the Pakistani administration. The present environment, rife with allegation and counter-allegation, with high levels of suspicion, is unhealthy, dangerous and depressing.