Bloody Borders

That India lived in a dangerous neighbourhood has long been known, and in case we needed any reminder of the fact, we only have to look at events of the last week. The security situation in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Pakistan all took a turn for the worse and there seems little prospect of a compensating upward swing in the near future.

1)Pakistan

I do not remember the last time I heard good news coming out of Pakistan. First the government effectively handed over sovereignty to the Taliban in the valley of Swat, in a move that is widely being seen as a precursor to wider government abdication in FATA and Baluchistan. Many commentators have claimed, and I think justly, that to negotiate with the Taliban is futile, and that the only way to beat them is through a combination of judicial military strikes and a systematic eroding of their support base. Currently the opposite is happening-a rather simplified reading of the situation could be as follows: the CIA with the help of the ISI is attacking targets with drones, something that minimizes risk to American lives but which serves more often than not to kill innocent civilians, thereby validating the Jihadi cause. Certainly, there is no sense in handing over the fate of hundreds of thousands of people to a quasi-terrorist group and then hoping that the group will be satisfied with what they've got. The best description of the deal that I have come across is one provided by Brahma Chellaney-he calls it a faustian bargain. I have said before that Pakistan is playing with fire when it promotes Jihadi elements, but in this case it seems as if Pakistan is willfully walking down the path of self destruction. Whose side is the ISI on? And what do the people of Pakistan want? A Pakistani Taliban sitting in Islamabad? And as the Taliban in Pakistan goes from strength to strength, the Pakistani politicians continue to try to outdo each other in terms of incompetence. Nawaz Sharif has been banned from contesting elections by the current administration, in what seems like a desperate bid by the increasingly unpopular Asif Zardari to stay in power. Unless the politicians of Punjab and Sindh can bridge the divide that separates them and provide courageous, farsighted leadership, there seems little hope for Pakistan.

2)Sri Lanka

The Rajapakse government is gloating over its military success against a somewhat beleaguered and it seems, rather tired, LTTE. Now I am no fan of V Prabhakaran or his organization. I think that they have almost as much to harm the cause of Sri Lankan Tamils as decades of Sinhalese discrimination. This is evident in the manner in which they have forcibly radicalized Tamil civil society, driving away, or worse, assassinating, moderate Tamils; and in their insistence on putting all their faith in a military solution. They have also ensured, with the killing of Rajiv Gandhi, that never again will the Indian government actively support the cause for Eelam. However I have no patience for President Rajapakse either. He is the embodiment of Sinhalese chauvinism and his complete lack of faith in the negotiation process smacks of an attempt to bully his way out of a long standing crisis. The unabated military action against the LTTE has created an unprecedented humanitarian disaster in Sri Lanka, and one wonders why, if people like Omar Bashir of Sudan can be accused of war crimes, President Rajapakse cannot. Moreover, I am forced to wonder how successful this action will be. Countless examples, from Gaza to Kashmir, prove that the use of disproportionate force on an opponent that is capable of hiding behind civilians, only creates more trouble. I would not be surprised in the LTTE goes underground once again, and continues its struggle from there. The Tamils of Sri Lanka have not taken up arms for no reason, and while I do not condone the excesses of the LTTE, I do believe that it is impossible to beat into subjugation those who are fighting for their inalienable rights of citizenship. Ultimately, the situation in Sri Lanka can only be solved through a protracted cease fire and negotiated settlement. The military success of the Sri Lankan army only makes this possibility seem more remote than ever before.

3) Bangladesh

The Sheikh Hasina government met with its first major challenge as sections of the army mutinied over salary issues. The mutiny has since been put down, but it points to a wider problem inherent in Bangladeshi affairs. The Bangladeshi army is radicalized outfit, and one suspects that the salary, low as it is, served as a cover for the soldiers. Sheikh Hasina has pledged to tackle extremist organizations that have found safe haven in Bangladesh and it is likely that sections of the army do not wholly approve of this step.

What are the implications of events in neighbouring countries on India? The answer is, in one word, profound. The treatment of Tamils in Sri Lanka and the Indian governments failure to provide a coherent plan to assist them will be a major poll issue in Tamil Nadu. It may force the DMK to sever its links with the Congress as it attempts to battle anti-incumbency and retain as many seats as possible. This in turn could push the Congress towards the AIADMK, which is widely expected to perform well in these elections. On a broader foreign policy level, the actions of the Sri Lankan government and the subsequent Indian reaction point to a increasing irrelevance of India in Sri Lankan affairs. India, while refraining from supporting the LTTE, must make a strong case for a cease fire and a return to the negotiating table. The government must stop trying to compete with China in aiding Rajapakse, and instead take a harder line on him, criticizing him for his unilateral escalation of force. India must push for a solution whereby the Tamils either get a semi-autonomous state, or equal cultural rights within the Sri Lankan union. This is not meddling in the internal affairs of another country-this is acting in one's own best interest, with the view that foreign policy cannot and should not be alienated from domestic policy.

Bangladesh provides a different, but in some ways more palatable challenge. Sheikh Hasina is openly pro-India, and she has earned a huge mandate from her people. The opportunity is ripe for the Indian government to strengthen Indo-Bangla ties by investing heavily in infrastructure development in that country, bolstering trade, and working to ensure that Bangladeshi civil society does not fall under the influence of radical Islamic groups. What is important is that India plays a proactive role in this regard, and does not merely provide nominal assistance to the Hasina government.

Pakistan offers the most pressing challenge to Indian foreign policy. There is a general idea that democracy is a good thing and must be bolstered, but if the parties that make up Pakistani democracy are hell bent on destroying the system that provides them the forum to survive, there is really not much India can do. As a result, I believe India must keep its demands few and consistent-the Taliban must be opposed at all costs, the civilian government must muster the courage to take on pro-Jihadi elements within the administration and ultimately must move to maintain the moderate nature of Pakistani civil society.

Evidently India faces a number of foreign policy challenges. South Block can't complain of being underemployed.

The Big Picture

The journalist Siddhart Vardarajan recently talked to some students at Yale on a variety of topics pertaining to current affairs in India. Here's the crux of what he had to say:

1) On the Mumbai Terror Attack:

Evidence points to Pakistan-of that there is no doubt. But which Pakistan? Vardarajan pointed out that there are many competing groups within Pakistan-the army, the ISI, the Jihadis, the political parties, civil society-and that it is likely that the terror attack did not have the sanction of the civilian government. Instead, the common belief seems to be Jehadi groups within Pakistan working with some elements within the army and the ISI carried out the attack. The phrase 'Jihadi groups' points to LeT, but what is interesting is that the LeT is no longer working as an independent Jihadi group. Rather there is clear evidence that it has developed ties with the Pakistani Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives working on the western border. This explains the targeting of Americans and Jews, something that LeT is not known to have done in the past. Keeping these new ties between the LeT and other Jihadi groups in mind, Vardarajan espouses a rather complex motive behind the attacks. He believes that the attacks took place to create tension between India and Pakistan, which would force Pakistan to pull troops out of the western front and move them to the Indian border, thereby relieving some pressure on the Pakistani Taliban and Al Qaeda.

2) On India-Pakistan relations:

Despite the recent positive developments in Indo-Pak relations (after reaching a low in December-January), Vardarajan is fairly pessimistic about the relations between the two countries over the next few years (although he does say that all out war is unlikely). The primary reason for this is the nexus between the LeT and the Taliban. As long as this nexus is allowed to thrive in Pakistan, terrorist attacks will continue in India and this will prevent a substantial improvement of relations. Vardarajan believes that Pakistan will not crack down on Jihadi groups largely because once the Americans leave Afghanistan (which is bound to happen at some time), they want to ensure that they have a tried and tested Jihadi apparatus left to fill the power vacuum.

3) On the upcoming elections:

The short answer seems to be: the UPA is coming back. Also look out for a resurgent AIADMK, TDP, BSP and a still powerful Left. Neither the UPA nor the NDA will get more than 200 seats, so third front support will be essential. Vardarajan has great faith in the Indian voter. He believes they will reject divisive politics, that deep down they think the BJP is responsible for the growth in terrorism, that they recognize the NREGS is a central scheme, that they are not swayed by the theory of anti-incumbency.

And now for some of my views:

1) I agree primarily with much of Vardarajan has to say on foreign policy (who am I not to). However one major issue I have with him is his determination to separate the Kashmir issue from the Mumbai attacks. He claimed that because of the convergence of Indian and Pakistani views on Kashmir in the last 5 years, Kashmir was not the reason why Mumbai was attacked. However, if we are to believe that the Jihadi groups were primarily responsible for the attack, and not an official wing of the Pakistani establishment, then I wonder how easy it is to isolate Kashmir entirely. Certainly Jihadi groups have a motive in getting Pakistani troops away from the Afghan border, but I think the more pressing reason for the attack is as follows: Jihadi groups wanted to derail the peace process and strengthen extremist groups in India (namely the BJP). The timing of the attack-just before a round of state elections, points to this fact. Presumably, the terrorists felt that the attacks would result in the Indian public taking a hard line and sweeping the BJP into power. Why would they want this to happen? Because groups like the BJP were primarily responsible for the huge azadi demonstrations that took place in Kashmir last summer-remember the Amarnath controversy? The relationship between a strong BJP and popular discontent in Kashmir seems to be a direct one, and this is of great benefit to groups like the LeT, which receive much of their funding and popular support due to their stand on the Kashmir issue.

2) Vardarajan is certainly spot on when he comes to predicting the future of Indo-Pak relations. Until Pakistan dismantles its carefully constructed Jihadi framework, terror attacks will continue in India and relations will remain sour. What is baffling is why Pakistani officialdom does not crack down on the Jihadis. Recent events in Swat, where the government has effectively ceded administration to the Jihadi groups, points to the fact that the Pakistani authorities have created a Frankenstein monster. It is quite possible that their obsession to control Afghan domestic affairs and hurt India with a thousand small cuts (the two primary reasons for the creation of the Jihadi apparatus) at the same time will lead to Pakistan itself being consumed by the Jihadi fireball.

3) On the issue of the general elections, I believe that Vardarajan may indeed have got it wrong. The UPA may come back-I don't deny it. But to say that the Indian voter will turn away from the BJP because of divisive politics or that most voters recognize NREGS to be a central scheme is, I believe, wrong. The BJP is stronger than ever in states like Gujrat and Karnataka despite shockingly divisive politics. Just because Delhi did not fall under the spell of divisive politics does not mean that the BJP's style of functioning has no appeal. As for the question of NREGS, Vardarajan believes that the BJP lost in Rajasthan because people recognized NREGS to be a central scheme. I believe that the primary reason for the BJP's defeat was not this however. Rather I think that the abrasive personality politics employed by Vasundhara Raje turned a lot of people off and created divisions within her party, which led to her defeat. Moreover, even if the people of Rajasthan looked at NREGS as a Central scheme, the people of MP and Chattisgarh certainly did not. Indeed the fact that the BJP won in MP and Chattisgarh, thus defying anti-incumbency, does mean something.

Vardarajan also ruled out the possibility of Mayawati becoming PM, saying that she will get not more than 50 seats. I'm not sure how true this is-I believe that she may even get closer to 60. I certainly think she has a reasonable shot at the PM's chair.

Despite my disagreements with Siddharat Vardarajan, I must put on record what a pleasure it was hearing him speak. He is a lucid speaker, certainly knows his stuff, and provides an original insight into a number of issues. I look forward to reading his columns more regularly in future.

About time

It looks like the day when long-overdue international developments finally transpire. Just as Israel prepares to announce a ceasefire in Gaza, Pakistan has finally admitted that India provided it with proof of some Pakistani involvement in the Mumbai terror attacks (The Hindu). I wonder if the mild pressure put on Pakistan by David Milliband had any effect. The Pakistani Interior Minister, Rahman Malik, announced that an internal probe would be launched and the process taken forward through the judiciary. He declined to set a timeframe.

It's too early for any reactions from the Indian side or word on what's next, but I'll be updating regularly as those reactions come in.

Prozac Please

Almost a month and a half after the attacks in Bombay, there seems to be no sign that Pakistan is willing to seriously move on terrorist groups that exist within its borders. Although no one really expected immediate moves in this regard by the Pakistani government, the events that have unfolded since the attack are most likely to leave the informed Indian depressed and decidedly suspicious of Pakistan's willingness to combat 'terror', something it has emphasised time and again.

In particular, the Pakistani government's continuous 'flip-flopping' on major issues and the fact that it is still in official denial of the nationality of the terrorists, (let alone anything else) is hardly likely to build confidence or trust in the minds of the Indian people. Sitting in India, we have watched as President Zardari says one thing on one day, and another on the next. We watched as Nawaz Sharif admitted to Kasab being a Pakistani and then was forced to retract his statement; watched as NSA Durrani was sacked for admitting Kasab was a Pakistani; watched as a prominent Pakistani TV Channel interviewed Kasab's father in a village in Pakistan. We watched as Pakistan dismissed, within a day of receiving, a dossier of evidence that India supplied as 'un-credible'. We have watched this with a mixture of anger and disbelief. And we have debated endlessly about who is in charge of Pakistan and whether or not there is a group in Pakistani politics, however small it may be, which actually wishes to crack down on groups responsible for the attacks. Today the ordinary Indian is none the clearer. Justice seems an unrealistic wish. Perhaps we should just hope that another attack does not happen.

There was a hope that the US would put a decisive amount of pressure on the Pakistani administration to act on the those responsible for the attacks. After all, 6 citizens of the United States had died in the attacks. Yet I believe that ultimately India will have to fight Her battles alone-no one will fight them for us. As long as Pakistan can use its active participation in the war against the Taliban on the Afghan border as a bargaining chip with the United States, the US is unlikely to weigh in strongly on India's side.

The US is clearly stuck between a rock and a hard place when it comes to policy on Pakistan. Pakistani action against the Taliban is moderate at best. It is my belief that the Pakistani administration still sees the Taliban as its best bet in Afghanistan. Certainly, the current government, with its strong Indian ties (India has pumped an unprecedented amount of aid into Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, and we have a consular presence in not one but five Afghan cities), and determination to destroy Taliban havens inside Pakistan, does not enjoy strong ties with the Pakistani. Yet the US cannot really act against Pakistan because without its cooperation, the war against the Taliban is impossible to wage. As long as Pakistan does not provoke India into resorting to military action, what it does with India is of secondary concern to the US. Yet one cant help but feel that the sooner the US realises that fighting terrorism in one corner of a country and condoning it another is hardly going to make you win a war, the better is for not only them, but the international community at large.

I do not really fault the action of our government in the aftermath of the Bombay attacks. We have taken a fairly consistent line, and barring the notable exception of A R Antulay, politicians across the spectrum have spoken in a fairly united voice. To bomb Pakistan, as many enraged Indians had called for, would have been a most irresponsible step, for obvious reasons. Instead India must persist with the diplomatic offensive on Pakistan. The difficult decision that India must take pertains to policy in the long run. Should India take the 'hard line' and say no movement on anything else until the terrorists are brought to book, or the more 'moderate line' which would involve maintaining the demand for justice while ultimately looking to reinvigorate the peace process. Both sides have legitimate arguments for and against. To briefly outline one: going back on the peace process is something that the terrorists arguably want, and thus a sort of 'reward' for their actions. However persisting with the peace process despite various attacks is something India has tried before with little tangible result, save the regular punctuation of bomb blasts in our cities.

While the Pakistani administration may gloat over India's perceived helplessness, what is clear is that it is playing with fire. Increasingly large parts of Pakistan are no go zones for Pakistanis themselves. Pakistani cities are bombed fairly regularly too. World confidence in Pakistan's reliability as a partner in the war on terror is dwindling. Indeed, Pakistan is slowly burning its bridges with the rest of the world, in a bid to satisfy what seems like a political obsession with an anti-India policy. In an attempt to inflict a thousand small cuts on India, one can only hope, for their sake, that they don't inflict a mortal wound on themselves, and change the very character of the society in which they live. One can't help but feel that good relations with India should be a goal for the Pakistani administration. The present environment, rife with allegation and counter-allegation, with high levels of suspicion, is unhealthy, dangerous and depressing.

Aazadi?

Basharat Peer's first book, Curfewed Night, is reportedly flying off racks in bookshops across the country, and I can see why. To be extremely brief, the book is about Kashmir. But it is not a strictly political or military account, nor is it a historical account seeking to determine whether Kashmir really should be a part of India or not. It is instead a book which tells stories, stories of ordinary people, people who are tortured, who are forced to leave their homes, whose lives are ruined; stories of girls who remain unmarried because there are no men left to marry, of parents who wished they had daughters because their sons never came home. As an Indian, it is painful reading Curfewed Night. It is painful because Peer says things that most Indians don't want to hear. Through his stories he says that Kashmirs don't want to be a part of India, that the Indian military has committed human rights abuses on an unparalleled scale in Kashmir. He even talks about how Kashmirs cheer for any team, even England, when they are playing against India. And he writes in a manner in which you feel he is saying nothing but the truth. Curfewed Night is, I believe, compulsory reading for every Indian.

How then do we reconcile Curfewed Night with what happened in Srinagar today. Omar Abdullah was sworn in as Chief Minister after an election in which more than 60% of the electorate braved the sub zero temperatures to come out and vote. A 60% turn out is impressive anywhere in the world. It is unprecedented in Kashmir. The vote threw up, as expected, a hung assembly. In the Jammu region, the BJP, riding on the Amarnath controversy made great gains. The valley remained split between the PDP and Abdullah's NC. And the Congress, playing kingmaker as it did last time round, decided to support the NC. I shall not discuss here why voters voted the way they did or why the Congress acted the way it did. Instead I wish to ask what such a high turnout means for the future of Kashmir.

Here is what I think it does not mean. It does not mean that support for separatism is dead. It does not mean that Kashmirs have given up on their demand for 'aazadi'. It does not mean that Kashmirs like India. A look back at the protests in Srinagar last summer bears testimony to this fact.

But it does mean that India should not get out of Kashmir (despite whatever various journalists might have had to say last summer), that Kashmirs want their basic grievances addressed, that the Abdullahs have genuine support in Kashmir, especially in rural areas, and that the Hurriyat must move quickly if it wants to remain relevant in peoples minds.

And here is why it does mean all of the above:

Why should we not give Kashmir up? Because we have no one to give it up to. The people of Kashmir do not want to be a part of Pakistan. They have shown by this vote more than anything else that they have faith in democracy. What democracy will they get in Pakistan? Their Kashmiri brothers in PoK remain controlled by Islamabad. All elections in PoK are an eyewash. To join Pakistan would mean substituting rule from Delhi with rule from Islamabad, and much as Peer may write about Kashmiris cheering Pakistani cricket teams, I think even he would agree that some form of local democracy is better than none at all.

Why do Kashmiris want basic grievances addressed? Because for close on 20 years, they have been systematically ignored as Kashmir has turned into a battleground between the military and the militants. A boycott of elections is useless because the Hurriyat (which calls for it) doesn't talk about development. It only talks of freedom. Talk of freedom is fine, but what happens when you cant find a job, get 2 square meals a day, don't have proper access to health care? The people of Kashmir may desire freedom. But they also desire development, and hence the vote.

The support for the Abdullah's has not diminished, no matter how many times Farooq presses the self destruct button. And the Abdullah's do provide a credible alternative to the Hurriyat. If the Hurriyat were to enter elections, they may not get more seats than the NC and the PDP.

For all these reasons the Hurriyat must move to remain relevant. (By the Hurriyat here I mean the moderate wing). They must enter the Indian political setup and campaign for their demands from within. The voters have already legitimized the Indian system of democracy, even if they haven't reconciled themselves to permanent Indian rule. Yet will the Hurriyat act? I believe that their lack of widespread support outside the major cities like Srinagar, and the fact that many of the Hurriyat leaders have their fingers in the pie, (Kashmir receives huge amounts of money from the centre, certainly this doesn't trickle down to the masses and the Hurriyat leaders live in palaces. Do the arithmetic yourself) prevents them from doing so.

While many Kashmiris may desire their land to become a Switzerland of the East, I think most understand that that is impossible in the near future. An independent Kashmir would have to be guaranteed by at least India, China, Pakistan and the US. When these countries cant agree on anything right now, what hope is there for them to agree on Kashmir. The fact that they have voted in such high number is thus a positive sign. The government must make good on its promises, the army must strive to interfere as little as possible with daily life in Kashmir, and ultimately relations with Pakistan must improve so that the LoC can become an open border and economic ties can strengthen between the two Kashmirs.